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he United States is unique in its
commitment to local government as the
primary provider of essential public services
and in its use of local taxes as the primary
means for paying for these services. The Philadelphia
metropolitan area is typical of the U.S. pattern. But
the city of Philadelphia faces the burdens and
responsibilities of all older central cities, including a
higher proportion of poor residents than its surrounding
suburbs. Such circumstances lead the city to impose
higher taxes on city residents, workers, and businesses.
Raising revenues through higher taxes, however,
becomes self-defeating when tax rates drive people and
businesses away.  The result is a weaker city and
regional economy.  How can Philadelphia strengthen its
finances? Bob Inman proposes a targeted program of
suburban assistance to lower the commuter wage tax
and presents evidence that such a program is likely to
benefit city and suburban residents alike.
Should the residents of
Philadelphia’s suburbs — Bucks,
Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery
separate school districts servicing a
combined population of 3.85 million
residents.1   Local property taxes and,
particularly in the case of the Philadel-
phia region, local resident wage and
income taxes are the primary sources of
locally raised revenues.  In the Delaware
Valley, property taxes account for 58
percent and wage/income taxes an
additional 28 percent of all locally raised
revenues. Locally raised revenues pay
for 77 percent of local government and
school district spending in the five-
county Philadelphia area. Fiscal
transfers from the state cover most of the
remaining 23 percent.
While only one of many local
governments in the metropolitan area,
the city of Philadelphia is arguably the
region’s economic, cultural, and
entertainment center.  The city has 34
percent of the five-county region’s jobs.
There are 12 Fortune 500 corporate
headquarters in the five-county area,
and eight of those headquarters are
located in Philadelphia. Four of the
nation’s 100 largest law firms have their
home offices in Philadelphia.  Phila-
delphia’s four medical schools are
national leaders in patient care and
medical research. Together, the four
schools currently receive more than
$550 million a year in National Institutes
of Health funds for faculty research.
Higher education is a major industry for
the region, and 46 percent of the
1 There are also four New Jersey counties
included in the official definition of the
Philadelphia metropolitan statistical area
(MSA).  For the reasons noted in footnote 9,
these counties are not included in this paper’s
policy analysis.
counties — contribute to the financing
of services provided to city residents and
businesses?  The United States is unique
in its commitment to local government
as the primary provider of essential
public services and in its use of local
taxes as the central means for paying for
these services.  The Philadelphia
metropolitan area is typical of the U.S.
pattern.   In the five counties that
comprise the Pennsylvania portion of the
Philadelphia metropolitan area, there
are 243 municipal governments and 62  Business Review  Q2  2003   25 www.phil.frb.org
city and suburban homeowners both
gain; regional home values are predicted
to rise by $2.1 billion, or about $2250 per
family.
THE ECONOMIC CONNECTION
BETWEEN CITY AND SUBURBS
There are two potential links
from the city economy to suburban
residents’ economic welfare: jobs and
wage income for suburban commuters
and the market price for city-produced
goods and services purchased by
suburban firms and residents.  For a
typical suburban resident, the primary
economic advantage of a strong city
economy lies in the ability of city firms
to provide goods and services at prices
lower than (or, equivalently, at a quality
higher than) what might be available
from suburban firms or from firms
outside the metropolitan region.3   The
central city’s economic advantage can
arise from either of two sources: natural
advantages because of the city’s
proximity to an important production
input such as power or raw materials
(e.g., Pittsburgh’s history as a steel
production center), or agglomeration
advantages facilitated by the density of
firms and households within the city. For
U.S. cities today, the likely source of any
advantage is agglomeration economies.
Agglomeration economies
benefit producers and consumers of city-
produced goods and services.  A high
The unique fiscal burdens that
Philadelphia faces contribute impor-
tantly to these tax differentials.  The
danger is that these added burdens —
and resulting higher tax rates — will
undermine the city’s economic, cultural,
and entertainment advantages to the
detriment of all residents in the five-
county region. Large cities often have
significant cost advantages, known as
agglomeration economies, in producing
and providing goods and services.
These agglomeration economies arise
when firms, retail stores, or cultural
activities are concentrated in common
and usually small geographic areas
within the city.  High tax rates and low
quality public services, however, may
drive firms and middle and upper
income households from the city. As
firms and families exit, city agglomera-
tion economies are lost.  The loss of
agglomeration economies leads to higher
prices for city-produced goods and
services. Population and income grow
more slowly or decline, and house values
in the city and suburbs fall. In the end,
the region as a whole loses, not just the
central city.
The solution is to strengthen
city finances. To this end, suburban
residents might wish to make a contribu-
tion, most realistically done through
adjustments in state assistance to local
governments.  If done correctly,
suburban fiscal assistance to the central
city can be a high-return investment in
suburban jobs, growth, and house values.
Here I offer one proposal for
such assistance, a targeted program of
suburban assistance to lower the
commuter wage tax.   With this reform,
region’s college and graduate school
enrollees attend Philadelphia universi-
ties.  The Philadelphia Orchestra, the
Curtis Institute of Music, the Philadel-
phia Museum of Art, the Franklin
Institute, and the Philadelphia Zoo are
world-recognized centers of arts and
science education.  Philadelphia has the
area’s four major league sports fran-
chises.  There are 13 professional
theaters providing full seasons, two
professional dance companies, and nine
music venues featuring artists from
major record labels. Of the region’s 318
restaurants rated excellent by the 2002
Zagat’s Guide, 220 are in Philadelphia.
Though it is the economic and
entertainment center of the region,
Philadelphia also faces the burdens and
responsibilities of all older central cities.
Philadelphia is home to most of the
region’s poor and elderly households.
While the city has 39 percent of the
region’s population, it has 70 percent of
the region’s poor. Philadelphia residents
also face significantly higher rates of
crime.  In 1998, the rate of violent crime
was 1465 per 100,000 residents in
Philadelphia, yet only 286 per 100,000
residents in the suburbs; the rate of
property crime was 5855 per 100,000 in
Philadelphia compared with 2503 per
100,000 in the suburbs.  These higher
service burdens from poverty and crime
necessarily translate into higher city tax
rates. The overall tax burden for a typ-
ical homeowner in Philadelphia is 14.4
percent of family income but only 9.5
percent for an identical family living
and working in the suburbs. A similar
differential tax burden holds for a
typical city firm.  Leaving the city for a
suburban location will lower a firm’s
effective state and local tax burden on
profits from 16.5 percent to 13.2
percent.2
2 The estimates of local tax burdens are
available from my biennial report on local
taxation, “Local Taxes and the Economic
Future of Philadelphia: 2002 Report.”
3 See the article by Richard Voith for more
about the advantages commuter suburbanites
derive from a strong city economy, with
particular reference to Philadelphia
commuters.
Though it is the economic and entertainment
center of the region, Philadelphia also faces
the burdens and responsibilities of all older
central cities.26   Q2  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
For example, Mark Beardsell
and Vernon Henderson found that
doubling the number of computer firms
in a given location increases the
productivity of those firms as much as 17
percent; little wonder, then, that the
Silicon Valley has become the world’s
leader for computer industry production
and innovation.  Though not as
dramatic, the findings of Antonio
Ciccone and Robert Hall showed that
overall employment concentration also
improves worker productivity; doubling
county-level employment density within
a state improves all worker productivity
in that state by 6 percent.  Ciccone has
found a similar effect of employment
concentration on worker productivity in
European firms.4   Finally, Stuart
Rosenthal and William Strange find that
the benefits of employment density
occur within small geographical areas
and are typically exhausted beyond a
distance of five miles.  The Rosenthal-
Strange results suggest, importantly, that
the spatial reach of agglomeration
advantages will typically be confined
within a political jurisdiction. For
historical reasons, that political jurisdic-
tion is most often the region’s central
city.
The gain to city and suburban
residents of living in or  near a produc-
tive central city comes largely from their
ability to buy city-produced goods and
services at comparatively low prices.
This advantage is larger the more goods
and services suburban households and
firms buy from city producers and the
greater are the cost and shipping
advantages those city producers have
over their closest competitors.  For
suburban residents in the Philadelphia
metropolitan area, it is cheaper to buy
expert legal advice, accounting services,
life-saving medical care, or first-run
professional entertainment from
Philadelphia businesses and venues than
from those in New York, Baltimore, or
Washington, D.C.  James Rauch has
shown that the ultimate beneficiaries of
access to low-cost goods and services
due to agglomeration economies are the
region’s workers and home owners.
Wages and house prices are higher in
economically more efficient regions.
Low quality public services or
high city taxes are one important factor
that might undo this economic advan-
tage, however. On this point the
evidence is clear. My research for
Philadelphia —now confirmed in
companion studies for Houston,
Minneapolis, and New York City —
shows unequivocally that high city taxes
unmatched by compensating service
benefits will drive middle- and upper-
income taxpayers and businesses from
density of firms within the same industry
— called Marshallian agglomeration in
honor of Alfred Marshall’s initial analysis
— leads to lower shipping costs for firms’
inputs when there are economies of
scale in transportation (e.g., coal and
iron ore to the steel mills of Pittsburgh
and Gary).  The density of firms may
also lower labor costs in industries when
laid-off workers from a declining firm
are quickly hired by an expanding firm.
This will be the case in industries where
brand loyalty is weak and current fads
define consumer demands, for example,
the fashion industry in New York, the
entertainment industry in Los Angeles,
and the “dot.com” industries of Silicon
Valley. Having many firms in the same
local labor market reduces the unem-
ployment risk to workers with unique
talents and therefore allows all firms in
the market to pay a lower wage. For
much the same reason, a high density of
firms in the same industry may also
encourage supplier innovation and
specialization, again lowering firms’
production costs. Furthermore, low-cost
production technologies are likely to be
more quickly copied when firms and
workers are in close proximity.  These
idea “spillovers” may occur within or
across industries, an advantage called
Jacobian agglomeration for Jane Jacobs’
insightful analysis of growing city
economies.  Finally, a high density of
households and firms gives rise to
agglomeration advantages in retailing
and consumer services, for example,
dining, specialty shopping, and enter-
tainment.  In Philadelphia, South Street,
Rittenhouse Square, and the Avenue of
the Arts are lively examples.
A growing body of economic
research has demonstrated the presence
and importance of agglomeration
economies in regional economies.  This
research has found that concentration
of  industry employment has a statisti-
cally significant and quantitatively
important effect on plant productivity.
The gain to city and
suburban residents of
living in or near a
productive central city
comes largely from





4 In addition, there is preliminary evidence
that an increased density of firms not only
increases the initial equilibrium level of
regional production and incomes but it may
also stimulate higher economic growth as
well, primarily through the sharing of ideas
and innovation. See the article by Edward
Glaeser, Hedi Kallal, Jose Scheinkman, and
Andrei Shleifer and the one by Vernon
Henderson, Ari Kuncoro, and Matt Turner. In
his Business Review article, Gerald Carlino has
provided a valuable survey of the theory and
evidence on agglomeration economies and the
economic performance of cities and regions.  Business Review  Q2  2003   27 www.phil.frb.org
the city, first to the surrounding suburbs,
but just as likely, to other regions of the
country as well.5   For example, I
estimate that Philadelphia lost 207,000
jobs over the past 30 years solely because
of increases in the city’s wage tax rate.
Most damaging for the location of
businesses in Philadelphia is the city’s
nonresident portion of the wage tax, a
tax whose burden is largely shifted back
onto city businesses as workers with
suburban job alternatives require a wage
increase to compensate for the city’s tax.
The recent wage tax cuts proposed by
former Philadelphia mayor Ed Rendell
and the current mayor, John Street, are
estimated to have restored approxi-
mately 12,000 of the jobs previously lost.
Similar adverse effects of high taxes on
city property values and city jobs have
shown up in Houston, Minneapolis, and
New York City.
  The loss of city jobs due to
high city taxes will mean a reduction  in
the city’s production advantage because
of lost agglomeration economies.  In our
2002 study, Andrew Haughwout and I
tested empirically the argument that
weak  public finances in the central city
can undermine private-sector economic
performance, for both city and suburban
residents.  Our study seeks to explain
the growth in city and suburban
incomes, populations, and house values
over the decade 1980 to 1990 for the 195
largest metropolitan areas in the United
States. Weak city finances are measured
in this study by four separate indicators
of budgetary pressure: the share of city
spending paid for through taxation of
5 See the article by Andrew Haughwout,
Robert Inman, Steven Craig, and Thomas
Luce.  The conclusion that high taxes and
low services depress local economies is now a
well-established fact more generally, and
Timothy Bartik provides an excellent review
of this research.
businesses and middle-class residents;
whether the city is required by state law
to bargain with its public employee
unions; whether the city lacks mayoral
veto control over city budgets; and the
fiscal burden of city poverty (Table 1).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1
show what happened to house values in
the average U.S.  central city and its
surrounding suburbs because of weak
city finances during the 1980s, the most
recent decade for which we have
complete information.6  On average, the
share of city taxes borne by middle and
upper income residents and firms rose 1
percent  over the decade (Change in
SHARE).  The consequence was to
depress house values in the average city
by $3638, or about 7 percent of the
initial 1980 value.  Importantly, the
house values in the average suburb fell
too, by $2468, or about 4 percent of their
initial 1980 values.  (See Understanding
the Economics Behind Table 1.)
Cities that are required by
state law to hire their labor services
exclusively from public employee unions
(BARGAIN) typically face higher labor
costs, and this raises city taxes. Again,
higher taxes without compensating
service benefits drive households and
firms from the city, and  city and
suburban house values decline from
what they might have been had the city
retained the right to hire nonunion
public employees — that is, to contract
out.  The average city house loses $5358,
or 11 percent of its initial 1980 value, by
being in a strong union city.  Suburban
6 Our full study reports the effects of weak
city finances on city and suburban incomes
and population as well; see Haughwout and
Inman (2002). Elsewhere we have shown that
changes in house values are the best single
predictor of changes in the economic welfare
of residents in a metropolitan area, so I shall
focus on these results here; see also the 2001
article by Haughwout and Inman.
house values fall too, now by $4047, or 8
percent of their 1980 values.7
The same adverse effects on
city and suburban house values, though
not as large, are seen when city budgets
are decided by a majority of ward-
elected city council members, un-
checked by a constitutionally strong
mayor with veto powers (GOVER-
NANCE). The budgets of such
governments typically favor neighbor-
hood services, with tax burdens
allocated toward business. We should
expect to see an exit of businesses from
the city, lost agglomeration economies,
higher prices for city goods, and for this
reason, lower city and suburban house
values.  This is what we find. City house
values are lower in weak governance
cities by an average of $1948 (4 percent
of 1980 values) while house values in
suburbs surrounding a weak governance
city fall an average of $3035, or 6
percent of 1980 values (see Table 1).
Interestingly, in cities with weak fiscal
governance, we see suburban house
values falling more than city house
values, but this too makes sense if city
7 While the typical city or suburban resident
loses by living in or near a strong union city,
unionized city workers are net winners.
Although the value of a unionized city
employee’s house falls like the house values of
all residents, the worker is compensated by
his or her gain in personal income. Estimates
of the premium unionized city employees earn
above what they might earn in their next best
private-sector job are typically 3 to 8 percent
of the worker’s wage; see the article by
Richard Freeman and Robert Valletta. For a
unionized city employee earning $30,000 a
year, this is an annual wage premium of $900
to $2400 per year.  Unionization reduces
house values by $5358 in the city and $4047
in the suburbs, implying an equivalent
annual loss in value of $270 a year for a city
house and $200 per year for a suburban house
when interest rates are 5 percent.  Conserva-
tively, then, the typical unionized city worker
in a strong union city gains $900 to $2400 in
wages each year and loses from $200 to $270 a
year in declining house value.  On balance,
city employees gain when working in cities
with strong public-sector unions.28   Q2  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
residents gain at the expense of city
businesses.  Unfortunately, what city
residents seem to gain from their budget
is more than offset by what they lose
from the decline in the city’s economy.
Estimates from a regression model Estimates from a simulation model
based on data from 195 U.S. metro areas of the Philadelphia area economy
Estimated Change in Estimated Change in Estimated Change in Estimated Change in
 Average U.S. City Average U.S. Surburban Average Philadelphia Average Philadelphia
 Home Value Home Value City Home Value Suburban Home Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in SHARE -$3638 -$2468 -$265 -$1224
(974) (873)
BARGAIN -$5358 -$4047 -$7184 -$5902
(1739) (1563)
GOVERNANCE -$1948 -$3035
(1052) (946) — —
Change in POVERTY -$12,345 -$6696 -$410 -$15
(2460) (2212)
TABLE 1
City Finances and Metropolitan Area Home Values
Columns 1 and 2: Source: Table 6, Haughwout and Inman (2002).
The standard error of the estimated change in the city median house
value is presented in parentheses below each estimate. Columns 3
and 4: Estimates of changes in the Philadelphia and suburban me-
dian home values are computed using an equilibrium political
economy model of the Philadelphia MSA, calibrated to match the
Philadelphia MSA for the decade 1980-90. The simulation model is
described in an appendix to this article.  Estimated changes in city
and suburban home values are computed for each of the following
four changes in the underlying structure of Philadelphia’s public
finances: Change in SHARE, allowing for the increase in the middle
and upper income families’ share of city taxes for 1980-90 because
of the change in the percent of Philadelphia’s population who are
poor or over the age of 65; BARGAIN allowing for a 20 percent
increase in the real cost of city services for 1980-90 because of the
32.9 percent increase in the real cost of city workers’ compensation
over the decade; the constitutional form of city GOVERNANCE
remained constant over the decade as the city retained its  strong
mayor form of government and thus there is no impact on city
budgetary costs nor city and suburban home values; Change in
POVERTY, allowing for the decline in the city’s rate of poverty
from 20.6 percent to 20.3 percent and the mandated increase in the
city’s real (inflation-adjusted) contribution for services for low-
income households of approximately $200 per poor household.
The most damaging change
for our nation’s largest cities during the
1980s came from the growth in the rate
of urban poverty (Change in POV-
ERTY) and associated increases in city
spending and taxes.  If the city’s rate of
poverty increased — and this was the
case for most U.S. cities — the resulting
added tax burden must be spread over
relatively fewer middle-class and  Business Review  Q2  2003   29 www.phil.frb.org
 UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS BEHIND TABLE 1
The estimated effects of
weak city finances reported in Table
1, columns (1) and (2), are statistical
estimates of the effects of weak city
finances on city and suburban home
values for a sample of the largest 195
U.S. metropolitan areas for the
decade 1980-1990.  The estimates in
Table 1, columns (3) and (4), are
estimates for the effects of changes in
the same city fiscal variables on
Philadelphia city and area suburban
home values for the decade 1980-
1990 derived from an economic
model of the metropolitan area
economy.  An Appendix to this
article provides a brief summary, and
Haughwout and Inman’s 2002 article
provides the technical details. An
important question to ask of any
statistical estimation or model
prediction is: Do the numbers make
economic sense?
These do. Here is a working
example using typical family incomes,
consumption, and interest rates for
the 1980s. Start with a suburban
family that, over the 1980s, spent
$50,000 per year, of which $10,000 is
allocated to city-produced goods and
services. Remember, these goods do not
have to be consumed in the city, but
simply made there or processed and
shipped by city businesses.  If a higher
city tax share leads to the exit of city
businesses and lost agglomeration
economies, how much would prices of
city-produced goods have to increase to
justify a $2500 decrease in suburban
house values (Column 2, Table 1)?
Prices of city-produced goods would
have to rise only 1.25 percent. Suburban
residents would pay $125 more per year
for their city-produced goods, and they
would lose this $125 every year.  An
annual loss of $125 is economically
equivalent to the estimated loss in house
value of $2500 when the real interest
rate is 5 percent.
What about city residents?
They suffer the same losses from high
prices for city goods, so their house
values should also fall by $2500 because
of lost agglomeration. But as seen in the
first entry of column 1 in Table 1, the
estimated average decline in city
house values is $3600. The additional
$1100 loss in value must come from
the direct adverse effects of higher
city tax shares.  In our sample, on
average, the city budget is $6000 per
family and the typical middle-income
resident’s share of city taxes is about
0.50. So an increase of 0.01 in the tax
share means an increase of about $60
each year in tax payments ((0.51-0.50)
x $6000 = $60).
But again this is an annual
loss that will be economically equiva-
lent to a one-time value loss of $1200
when real interest rates are 5 percent.
City residents lose $2500 because of
lost agglomeration and an additional
$1200 because of higher taxes.  In this
example, the total loss for a typical city
house will then be $3700, again very
close to the estimate in Table 1.
Similar calculations can be made for
all the numbers in Table 1; they are all
plausible.
business taxpayers.  The rise in city taxes
because of the average increase in the
rate of city poverty, which was 3
percent, led to an average loss in city
house values over the decade of
$12,345, a decline of more than 25
percent.
Rising city poverty, rising city
taxes, and a shrinking city economy
affect the suburbs, too.  We estimate the
average decline in suburban house
values over the decade from the growth
in city poverty equaled $6696, or 13
percent of the original 1980 suburban
house value.  When central cities
become poorer or the fiscal burden from
each poor household increases, city
residents lose, but importantly, so too do
residents in the city’s surrounding
suburbs. The path from city poverty to
suburban house values may be round-
about — from higher city poverty and
city taxes to a weaker city, then
regional, economy — but the impact is
significant nonetheless.
Finally, each of the four
sources of weak city finances is largely
outside the direct control of any city’s
mayor.  To be sure, poor fiscal manage-
ment by a city’s mayor or elected
council will also lead to higher city taxes
and lower city and suburban property
values, but that is not what we are
measuring in Table 1. Tax laws, the rules
of labor bargaining, the city charter,
federal and state mandates, the rate of
city poverty — these are the determi-
nants of weak city finances as measured
here, and each is given to, not chosen30   Q2  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
significant economic losses during the
1980s from weakened city finances.9
(See An Economic Model of Philadelphia
and Its Suburbs.)
First, as was true nationally, the
share of Philadelphia taxes borne by its
middle- and upper- income households
(Change in SHARE) rose 1 percentage
point, from 50 percent in 1979 to 51
percent by 1989.  The causes in
Philadelphia were the aging of the city’s
population and the city’s continued loss
of manufacturing jobs. The rise in
middle-class tax burdens led to a
predicted fall in city and suburban
house values (Table 1, columns 3 and 4).
Second, Philadelphia’s public
employees enjoy an exclusive right to
bargain with the city. Thus, Philadelphia
qualified as a strong union city (BAR-
GAIN) in the Haughwout-Inman
national study reported in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 1.  Each strong union
city in that study had its own bargaining
experience with unions, but on average,
those unions increased labor costs and
city taxes and depressed city and
suburban home values.  This appears to
have been the case in Philadelphia as
well. Over the decade, Philadelphia’s
public-employee unions were able to
negotiate labor contracts that increased
real — that is, inflation-adjusted —
compensation for city employees 33
percent, equal to an annual real rate of
growth of 2.89 percent in city workers’
pay. This increase in Philadelphia’s real
costs of public employees’ labor services
led to higher city taxes and, as was true
for the national sample of strong union
cities, significantly lower city and
suburban house values.  Our estimates of
the effect that strong public-employee
unions have on Philadelphia city and
suburban house values appear in
columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.
 Third, there was no change in
city governance (GOVERNANCE)
over the decade; Philadelphia had, and
continues to have, the strong mayor
form of city government. This row in
Table 1, therefore, shows no changes.
Finally, while the burden of
city poverty on Philadelphia’s budget is
high and has an important negative
effect on the performance of the
regional economy, as we will see below,
the 1980s did not add significantly to
that burden. Thus, the net economic
effects of the change in the rate of
poverty (Change in POVERTY) were
small as well.  The share of Philadel-
phians living in poverty fell slightly over
the decade from 0.206 to 0.203.  There
was, however, a small offsetting increase
in the city’s cost of serving that popula-
tion.10  Overall, poverty’s fiscal burden
on the city rose only slightly, and  the
estimated additional damage done to
by, the mayor. If a mayor is dealt weak
fiscal institutions, it should be  no




The estimated effects of weak
city finances on city and suburban
house values reported in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 1 are for a national
average city and its suburbs. While
Philadelphia is included in the
Haughwout-Inman national study, those
results cannot be applied directly to
Philadelphia. Perhaps Philadelphia was
one of the lucky cities dealt a winning
fiscal hand. Unfortunately, my estimates
from an economic model of the
Philadelphia metropolitan economy
show this is not the case.8   Philadelphia
faced many of the same fiscal difficul-
ties during the 1980s as our national
sample.  The results in columns (3) and
(4) of  Table 1 show that while the losses
were not as large as those felt nationally,
Philadelphia and its suburbs suffered
8 The estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1
for the Philadelphia economy are computed
using a general equilibrium simulation model
for the Philadelphia metropolitan area,
calibrated to match the economic and
political structure of the five Pennsylvania
counties in the Philadelphia MSA for the
decade 1980 to 1990; see the Appendix.
Ideally, I would have replicated the statistical
analysis of the national city sample for a
sample comprising only Philadelphia and its
suburbs, but unfortunately, this is not possible
because the required number of years of
suburban data are not available. In the
simulation model, the fundamental economic
relationship that determines the results in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 is the efficiency
advantage of city agglomeration economies;
the stronger these economies are, the larger
will be the adverse effects of weak city public
finances. For this analysis, I select a very
conservative elasticity of Philadelphia city
output with respect to city firm density of
only 0.01; the national average elasticity of
worker productivity with respect to firm
density is 0.06, as estimated by Ciccone and
Hall.
9 The four New Jersey counties of the
Philadelphia MSA are not included in the
simulation analysis for two reasons. First, New
Jersey now rebates the Philadelphia commuter
tax for New Jersey suburban residents. This
different treatment of an important city tax
requires separate analyses for the Pennsylva-
nia and New Jersey suburbs of Philadelphia.
Second, since our focus is on the economic
returns to reforming city and suburban
financing of city services,  I have chosen what
seemed to be the most politically realistic
group of suburban counties to be included in
any such reforms.  Those counties are in
Pennsylvania alone.
The city’s adverse fiscal changes over the
1980s are estimated to have reduced the
value of a typical city and suburban house
each by about $8000.  Business Review  Q2  2003   31 www.phil.frb.org
city and suburban house values is barely
noticeable.
All together, the city’s adverse
fiscal changes over the 1980s are
estimated to have reduced the value of
a typical city and suburban house each
by about $8000, a loss in value of 9
percent for Philadelphia home owners
and 6 percent for suburban home
owners.11  Far and away the most
important cause of these economic losses
for our region was the increase in city
taxes required to fund the significant
growth in the real compensation of the
city’s public employees.
INVESTING IN STRONGER
CITY FINANCES: A STRATEGY
FOR GROWTH IN THE
PHILADELPHIA REGION
Both in the nation and in
Philadelphia, weak city finances lead to
the exit of mobile city firms and
households, a less efficient city
economy, and lower incomes and house
values for the region as a whole. Strong
city finances protect a city’s economic
efficiency and a region’s income and
wealth.  What might we do to
strengthen Philadelphia’s city finances,
and what will be the gains to city and
suburban residents from such a strategy?
Three Possibilities. The
analysis in Table 1 identifies three
possible directions in which the current
structure of Philadelphia’s finances
might be improved.  First, reduce the
city’s  relative tax burden on mobile
middle-class households and city firms.
10
 See the article by Anita Summers and Lara
Jakubowski.
11
 The decline in house values from the com-
bined fiscal changes will not equal the sum of
the three isolated changes because the exit of
households and firms has accelerating effects
in the presence of agglomeration economies.
Large adverse fiscal changes will be proportion-
ally more harmful than small changes.
Second, control the ability of the city’s
public employee unions to win favorable
compensation packages with greater-
than-inflation increases.  Third, reduce
the city’s fiscal obligation for services to
lower income households.
On its own, Philadelphia has
already made significant progress on two
of these three fronts. First, from 1995 to
today, the city has lowered its wage-tax
rates 9.27 percent and its gross-receipts
tax rates 29.3 percent. Increases in the
rates of these two taxes over the past 30
years have caused significant damage to
the city’s economy; so lowering these
rates is an important step toward
restoring our fiscal competitiveness.12
Second, since 1992, and in sharp
contrast to the 1980s, Philadelphia’s
compensation per public employee has
declined, in real dollar terms, at an
annual rate of  0.60 percent.  The city’s
improved labor compensation policy has
allowed balanced-budget tax reduc-
tions, significantly improving the city’s
ability to attract firms and households.
The one important fiscal weakness that
has not yet been addressed is the city’s
continuing high budgetary obligation for
support of its poor population.
The direct tax costs needed to
fund poverty-related county spending in
Philadelphia and in each of the four
surrounding Pennsylvania counties are
reported in Table 2.  Poverty spending in
Philadelphia is greater than comparable
spending in all suburban counties
combined (Table 2).  Further, the direct
tax burden of poverty spending as a
percent of county residents’ income is
roughly four to seven times higher in
Philadelphia than in the suburban
counties. While the residents of Bucks,
Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery
counties pay only 0.17 percent to 0.38
percent of their income in taxes to fund
poverty services, Philadelphia residents
pay taxes equal to 1.4 percent of their
income to fund city-provided poverty
services.
The root causes of these
spending and tax disparities are, first, the
geographical concentration of the
region’s poor and low-income elderly
households within the city, a concentra-
tion due in large measure to the
availability of older, lower cost housing
within the city,13  and second, the state
of Pennsylvania’s decision to make
counties the primary providers and
administrators of poverty-related
services. Seventy percent of the five-
county region’s poor live in Philadelphia,
and because the city is also legally a
county, Philadelphia must assume
primary fiscal responsibility for the
unreimbursed portion of the services
provided to those families. Philadelphia
spends more per taxpayer for poverty
services than the suburban counties, not
because poverty spending is a successful
election strategy or the city’s middle
class is particularly generous,  but
because, as the region’s oldest and
largest city, it has more poor families as
residents and because it is a city-county,
12   
For the most recent analysis of the effects of
city taxation on city business, see the article by
Haughwout, Inman, Craig, and Luce.
Poverty spending in Philadelphia is greater
than comparable spending in all suburban
counties combined.
13
 See the article by Edward Glaeser and
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state law demands it.14
Regionalization. In this
regard, Philadelphia stands in sharp
contrast to Pittsburgh.  Pittsburgh too is
an older city, and the current percent of
Pittsburgh’s residents who fall below the
poverty threshold (19 percent) is almost
TABLE 2
Direct Tax Cost of Poverty Spending to County Governments
in the Philadelphia Region: FY2002
(Millions of Dollars)
Bucks  Chester Delaware Montgomery Philadelphia Region
County (4.92%) (4.88%) (8.31%) (4.55%) (19.74%) (11.93%)
(County % Poor) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PUBLIC
HEALTH $3.816m  $12.951m $0m  $1.387m+ $76.203m  $94.357m
HUMAN
SERVICES  $5.198m  $8.169m  $4.992m  $53.069m+  $67.993m  $139.421m
CORRECTIONS $39.485m  $20.828m  $18.634m  $33.102m  $183.120m  $295.169m
EMERGENCY
SERVICES  $6.658m  $1.545m  *  *  $15.564m  $23.767m
TOTAL $55.157m $43.493m  $23.626m $87.558m $342.880m $552.714m
($ per Non-Poor) ($97.07) ($105.47) ($46.78) ($122.33) ($281.52) ($163.03)
(% of Income) (0.34%) (0.32%) (0.17%) (0.38%) (1.4%) (0.60%)
The direct tax cost to county residents of poverty spending is
defined as county poverty spending minus state and federal grants,
departmental earnings, and fees paid to the county for poverty
services, all reported in millions of dollars.  In Delaware County, for
example, all of county spending in FY 2002 for public health was
supported by nontax dollars.  The total dollar tax burden per nonpoor
household ($ per Non-Poor) is calculated as the total poverty
spending divided by the population of the county not below the
poverty threshold. The percent of county income required to support
the county’s tax cost of poverty (% of Income) is computed as the
total direct tax cost divided by total county residential income.
+Montgomery County classifies $37.838 million for geriatric
centers as spending within human services; other counties classify
such services as part of the public health budget.
* In Delaware and Montgomery counties emergency services
for low-income households have been classified as part of the human
services budget.
identical to Philadelphia’s. But
Pittsburgh’s taxpayers share the burden
of financing services for their city’s poor
with the suburban residents of Allegh-
eny County.  As a consequence,
Pittsburgh city residents face the same
tax burden on income as their suburban
counterparts, only 0.23 percent.15   This
rate is significantly below the 1.4 percent
burden on income now paid by Philadel-
phia city residents. From the perspective
of regional economic growth and
welfare, the Pittsburgh metropolitan
area has the financing right. Large
disparities in the fiscal costs of regional
poverty between local jurisdictions
discourage firms and households from
moving to high poverty locations. If
these locations are also the region’s
important centers of agglomeration
economies — as is likely the case in
Philadelphia — the firms and house-
holds that create those economies leave
and economic inefficiency results. The
whole region loses.
14
 In a recent study of poverty spending by Phila-
delphia, I showed that the trend in city spend-
ing is unrelated to who is mayor or to the racial
and ethnic composition of city council. The
main determinant of the city’s poverty spend-
ing is the performance of the city and national
economies. That is, when economic performance
improves and there are fewer families in pov-
erty, poverty spending falls.
15
 Allegheny County’s direct tax costs for the
poverty-related services totaled $64.867 mil-
lion in fiscal year 2002.  The tax burden on a
county resident not classified as poor equaled
$62.48 per resident. This burden as a percent of
county residential income equaled 0.23 per-
cent of county income.  Business Review  Q2  2003   33 www.phil.frb.org
One solution — the Pittsburgh
solution — is to regionalize the financ-
ing of poverty. The Pittsburgh area
achieved this efficient structure for
poverty financing by the luck of history.
Pittsburgh’s historic boundaries define a
geographically small city within a
geographically large county.  The
Philadelphia region has not been so
lucky.  To solve its financing ineffi-
ciency, the region must fashion a clear
policy for sharing the five counties’ cost
of regional poverty.  If the sharing is
done correctly, however,  everyone —
city and suburban residents alike — can
benefit.  The best policy will entail a de
facto transfer of approximately $191
million a year in poverty relief from the
suburbs to the city, with the transfer tied
to a required proportional reduction in
the city’s nonresident wage tax.  If
implemented, this policy is estimated to
increase the combined economic wealth
of city and suburban home owners by
$2.1 billion, an average of about $2250
per family.
Here is how a policy to transfer
funds and reduce the commuter tax
rate might work.  The budget data in
Table 2 allow us to calculate the
required suburb-to-city transfer needed
to ensure uniform regional financing of
regional poverty.  To meet the total
regional tax burden from poverty of
$552.7 million for fiscal year 2002, we
need a uniform regional income tax rate
of 0.60 percent. Suburban residents have
already made a contribution toward
their regional share, but in all cases, it is
below the uniform regional rate. For
example, the taxpayers of Bucks County
have already contributed 0.34 percent of
county income (Table 2) toward the
target contribution of 0.60 percent; so
the reform policy would ask those
residents to pay an additional 0.26
percent, or in total about $42.622 mil-
lion, toward the reform policy.  Similar
calculations can be completed for each
of the other three suburban counties.
For fiscal year 2002, the total
reform contributions from the four
suburban counties would equal $191
million, or about $220 per suburban
family.16   This total would then be paid
to the city to lower its poverty-related
tax burden.  Importantly, no money
need actually change hands among the
five counties. Since each suburban
county receives from the state poverty-
related grants and reimbursement
revenues greater than its required
contribution for uniform regional
poverty financing, the state can
implement the regional policy by
reallocating a portion of suburban grants
to Philadelphia.  There is no need for
regional taxation or regional government
to implement poverty-financing reform.
Transfer of Money. How the
money is given to Philadelphia matters,
however. Table 3 estimates what might
happen to the values of typical city and
suburban houses and to total house
values regionwide when the reform
transfer is given to the city in one of
three ways.  For purposes of comparison,
Table 3 also reports census year 2000
house values for the current “No
Reform: Status Quo” policy.  Reform
Policy 1 gives the poverty-relief funding
to the city with “no strings attached” —
that is, the city is free to allocate the
funds any way it wishes.
Reform Policy 2 requires relief
funding to be allocated to a uniform
percentage reduction in the city’s wage
tax rates for residents and nonresidents.
The proposed level of city poverty relief
will permit a 10 percent reduction in
each of the two wage-tax rates.
Finally, Reform Policy 3
requires all of city poverty relief to be
allocated to reducing the wage-tax rate
for nonresidents. This strategy will be
particularly valuable to city businesses,
since they bear a large share of the
burden of the nonresident wage tax as
higher labor costs. Reform Policy 3 is
likely to be suburban residents’ favorite
option too, since they benefit most from
the larger and more productive city
economy that this strategy encourages.
Under Reform Policy 3, the nonresident
wage-tax rate can be reduced 22
percent.
Reform Policy 1. Under the “no
strings attached” policy, the city is free
to spend its poverty relief funds as it
chooses. The results reported in Table 3
assume the city allocates the new
monies to additional public services.
Under this assumption, Reform Policy 1
improves estimated city house values by
$155 per house, but suburban house
values are estimated to fall by $95.
Neither effect should be considered
economically significant. The total gain
in wealth for regional home owners is a
very modest $335 million, about 0.03
percent of their initial wealth, and all
the gain goes to city residents.
Reform Policies 2 and 3. Reform
Policies 2 and 3 look more promising.
Under the second reform strategy, the
city is required to allocate its poverty-
relief funding to a 10 percent reduction
in wage-tax rates for residents and
nonresidents. The average city house  is
estimated to rise in value by $1087, or
about 1.82 percent of its pre-reform
value. But, again, the value of the
average suburban house remains
essentially unchanged, falling by $63.
Overall, under Reform Policy 2, total
home-owner wealth, regionwide,  rises
16
 Chester County residents must contribute
an additional 0.18 percent of county income,
or $38.389 million; Delaware County an
additional 0.43 percent of county income, or
$59.313 million; Montgomery County an
additional 0.22 percent of  county income, or
$50.988 million. The total additional
contributions from the four suburban
counties is $191.312 million. When these
funds are given to Philadelphia for poverty
relief, the city’s net contribution to regional
poverty spending becomes $342.880m -
$191.312m = $151.568m, which is 0.60
percent of city resident income. For suburban
counties as a whole, $191 million equals 0.29
percent of aggregate suburban income as
reported in the 2000 census.34   Q2  2003 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
an estimated $558 million, or about 0.5
percent, and again the benefits are
concentrated in the central city.17
Under Reform Policy 3,
however, all home owners in the region
benefit, not just those in Philadelphia.
Even though suburban residents send
money to the city, suburban house
values rise an estimated 1.76 percent.
Why? The answer lies in the more
efficient regional economy that follows
TABLE 3
Regional Financing for Regional Poverty
City Average House Value  Suburban Average House Value Regional Total House Value
(% Change from Status Quo) (% Change from Status Quo) (% Change from Status Quo)
POLICY REFORMS (1) (2) (3)
NO REFORM: $59,700  $157,836  $111.76 billion
STATUS QUO (-) (-) (-)
 REFORM POLICY 1: $59,855  $157,741  $111.99 billion
“NO STRINGS ATTACHED” (0.26%)  (-0.06%) (0.03%)
REFORM POLICY 2: $60,787  $157,773  $112.21 billion
UNIFORM WAGE TAX CUT (1.82%) (-0.04%) (0.50%)
REFORM POLICY 3:
NONRESIDENT WAGE $60,960  $160,614  $113.74. billion
TAX CUT (2.11%) (1.76%) (1.87%)
Because all the required data for census year 2000 are not yet available,
the estimates of the post-REFORM POLICY house values reported
above were computed  from the simulation model of the Philadelphia
economy calibrated for the census year 1990 (see Technical Appendix).
For the suburban counties as a whole, the required equalizing transfer
of $191 million equals 0.29 percent of current suburban income; I
have therefore scaled the required suburban contribution to 0.29
percent of the 1990 suburban incomes for all policy simulations.  The
percentage changes in city and suburban house values are computed
using this scaled transfer.  The estimated percentage changes in regional
house values from the 1990 simulated economy (reported in
parentheses above) are then multiplied by the actual 2000 census
house values (reported here under NO REFORM: STATUS QUO)
to give estimates of the new, post-REFORM POLICY house values.
from Policy 3’s required reduction in the
wage-tax rate for nonresidents. The
economic effect of the city’s nonresi-
dent wage tax is to increase city firms’
labor costs roughly in proportion to the
tax rate. By reducing that tax rate,
Reform Policy 3 lowers labor costs in the
city, which encourages city businesses to
expand, more city jobs, and, most
important for suburban residents, more
low-cost city goods and services. In
dollars, the estimated net gain to a
typical suburban family in our simulated
regional economy will be an improve-
ment in house values of $2780, or about
$140 a year assuming a 5 percent
interest rate. Under Reform Policy 3, a
Philadelphia area suburban family
would “invest” $220 per year in higher
county taxes but then benefit by saving
$360 per year through their consumption
of lower cost, city-produced goods and
services.  The net gain is $140 a year.
Not a lot of money, perhaps, but a very
nice rate of return!
Most important, regional
financing of the cost of poverty is an
opportunity for Philadelphia and the
suburban counties to work together for
the benefit of all residents of the
Delaware Valley.  If it is done correctly
— for example, city poverty relief is
exchanged for lower commuter tax rates
for suburbanites — regional fiscal reform
can be a true win-win, enhancing house




There is much to recommend
our region’s decentralized system of
17
 The estimates in Table 3 for Reform Policies 1
and 2 are reassuringly similar to the estimates
for suburban-to-city aid reported in Haughwout
and Inman (2002) for their national sample. In
their national sample, cities that share county
functions with their suburban governments,
such as Pittsburgh, have significantly higher
average house values than do cities, such as
Philadelphia, which pay for county functions
on their own.  Business Review  Q2  2003   35 www.phil.frb.org
18
 The total difference in Reform Policy 3 minus
the status quo (Table 3): $113.74 billion - $111.76
billion =  $1.98 billion, or approximately $2
billion.
public finance. But when there are
important economic interdependencies
across local jurisdictions, fiscal coopera-
tion, not fiscal competition, is required.
One important economic interdepen-
dency, known as agglomeration
economies, occurs within our central
cities. This interdependency creates
significant production  efficiencies and
allows valued product diversity, both of
which benefit all residents of the
economic region.  Inefficient public
finances in a city, however, can undo
these economies as firms and households
leave the city. On its own, Philadelphia
has made significant progress toward
efficient city budgeting since its 1990
fiscal crisis.  Growth in city workers’
compensation has been brought in line
with annual rates of inflation, and the
resulting savings in conjunction with
productivity improvements have allowed
balanced-budget reductions in the tax
rates for wages and gross receipts.
The problem that remains is
the city’s disproportionate share of the
region’s responsibility for poverty
spending, a burden it bears for historical
and legal reasons. Regional financing of
regional poverty will  neutralize this
threat to Philadelphia’s productive
efficiency, and the region as a whole will
benefit.  Reform can be implemented
within the existing structure of state
financing of county  poverty spending;
no new metropolitan government is
necessary, nor is there any need for
regionwide taxation. What will be
required, however, is a commitment on
the part of the city and the four
suburban counties to work together.
One promising option would provide city
poverty relief in exchange for lower
wage tax rates for nonresidents. Under
this reform, city and suburban residents
both gain, perhaps by as much as an
additional $2.0 billion in regional house
values, or $2250 per household.
18
  The
source of the gain is a more efficient
Philadelphia economy, made possible by
tax relief for suburban commuters. With
city and suburban cooperation for re-
gional poverty financing, we all win.
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
An Economic Model of Philadelphia and Its Suburbs
The predicted changes in
Philadelphia and suburban house values
reported in Table 1 Columns 3 and 4 and in
Table 3 were computed using a general
equilibrium model of household and firm
location, investment, employment, and
production within the Pennsylvania portion
of the Philadelphia MSA (Bucks, Chester,
Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia
counties).  The model is able to predict city
and suburban population, employment, firm
production, government spending and
taxation, worker wages, and finally home
values, given an initial fiscal and
demographic position for the city and its
suburbs. The analysis also takes as given
land available for the location of
households and firms, both within the city
and within the surrounding suburbs (Bucks,
Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery
counties).
The household sector consists of
three broad classes of families — those
whose adult head of household works and
earns the region’s competitive market wage,
those whose head is a manager and earns an
exogenous (outside the model) managerial
wage set by the national market for
managerial talent, and finally, those whose
adult head is unemployed and classified as a
family in poverty or over the age of 65. The
Philadelphia region must offer all its workers
and managers the same “standard of living”
— what economists also call “utility” — as
available elsewhere in the country.  Working
families can choose to live either in
Philadelphia or in the suburbs.  We assign
managerial households to live in the
suburbs, even though they may work in
Philadelphia.  Dependent households (those
in poverty or over 65) are assigned to live in
Philadelphia or the suburbs so as to match
the actual MSA data. Dependent house-
holds do not move in response to fiscal or
market incentives.  If a household lives in
Philadelphia, it receives the common level
of city services and pays city taxes, either as
property, wage, or sales taxation.  If the
family lives in the suburbs, it will receive the
average level of suburban public services
and it will pay the average suburban
property tax rate.  Managers who commute
into Philadelphia are also assessed the city’s
nonresident wage tax, but the burden of this
tax is shifted back onto the manager’s city
firm as an added cost of hiring a mobile
managerial worker.
The production sector of the
metropolitan economy consists of city firms
that produce and sell  a composite private
good and suburban firms that retail the same
private good but which must import that
good either from city firms or from firms
located outside the metropolitan area. The
composite good should be viewed in the
broadest sense to include all goods and
services a family might purchase in the
marketplace, from food to clothing to
entertainment to legal services to health
care.  For suburban retailers, it is cheaper to
import this composite private good from
Philadelphia firms for two reasons.  First,
because of agglomeration economies,
Philadelphia firms might be the low-cost
producer.  Second, suburban retailers are
closest to Philadelphia producers so this
saves on transportation costs. If the demand
for the composite good by suburban
residents exceeds the exports available from
Philadelphia firms, the suburban retailers
must import the private good from more
expensive regional or national providers.
The government sector consists of
a single central city, specified to
approximate the finances of Philadelphia,
and a single, all-encompassing suburban
government specified to approximate the
finances of an average local government plus
school district in the four counties
surrounding Philadelphia. Each local
government produces one common public
service and pays for the service using local
taxes and intergovernmental transfers from
state and federal governments net of
payments for local debt and underfunded
pensions.  In addition, both the city and the
suburb must meet required spending
obligations for their low-income and age-
dependent populations. City public services
benefit city firms and city residents, while
suburban public services benefit suburban
retailers and suburban residents. For
financing,  Philadelphia uses a property tax,
resident and nonresident wage taxes, and a
gross receipts tax on sales by city firms
within the city.  The suburban government
uses a local property tax.  Both local
governments are free to choose their own
local tax rates and thus the level of local
government spending on the public service.
The regional economy will be in
equilibrium when all firms within the region
earn the national competitive rate of return
on invested capital, all households living in
the region receive the national “standard of
living” or “utility,” managers earn their
nationally competitive after-tax managerial
salary, and the city and suburban
governments choose locally balanced
budgets.  If firms in the Philadelphia region
make more than the competitive rate of
return, more firms move into the metro-
politan area; if they make less, firms exit.
When firms move into the region, the
demand for land and labor increase, leading
to a rise in land prices and worker wages.
The increase in worker wages raises the
standard of living for residents in the region,
leading to regional population growth.
Having more regional workers moderates
the initial increase in wages but reinforces
the initial rise in land prices.   The opposite
effect on wages and land prices occurs when
firms leave the metropolitan area.
Firms will choose to enter the
region when they are more productive and
thus more profitable here than elsewhere.
An important source of production
efficiency will be city agglomeration
economies. Efficient city firms are more
profitable, attracting firms into the city.
Land prices and city wages rise. Having
more city firms also means more low-cost
city output for export to the suburbs.
Philadelphia suburbs are now more
attractive.  Suburban retailing output
expands and this in turn increases the
demand for suburban labor.  Both effects
raise suburban land values and suburban
wages.  In the end, improving central city
agglomeration economies makes all residents
living in the Philadelphia region richer.
A complete description of the
simulation model can be found in the 2002
article by Haughwout and Inman.